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Abstract
Economists have, for some time, studied the factors that induce firm entry, lead to growth, and
help firms succeed in various markets. Unfortunately, such patterns have not been considered
for the so-called “green industries.” Although policymakers might like to stimulate development
of the green sectors in encouraging sustainable growth, one difficulty has been defining exactly
what constitutes the green economy. We employ a recent, narrow definition proposed by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics to investigate and identify important factors for the green industries
within the State of Texas. We find some differences between the green industries and all other
industries, but these effects are often small relative to other major explanatory factors like
agglomeration. The definition also partitions the green industry into five subcategories and we
leverage this feature to study the importance of these factors for the intra-green industries and
to identify the comparative advantage each county has within the green economy.
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1 Introduction
Economists, particularly those concerned with firm behavior, have tried to identify features of
a market that attract investment, promote growth, and foster competition. The audience for
such information is vast: entrepreneurs want to know the best places to locate their plants while
policymakers are interested in attracting such investment. Of course firms are interested not just
in setting up shop, but in growing a successful enterprise. Likewise, policymakers want to retain
investments and encourage stable growth: having firms that constantly enter and exit their region
leads to economic uncertainty and fluctuations in market conditions. While researchers in industrial
organization and regional economics have documented such factors for some time, our focus is on
firms that comprise the “green industry.” Our objective in this paper is to analyze the factors that
explain entry, growth, and exit patterns in the green industry to determine whether these factors
affect the green industry in an inherently different way as compared to other industries. Identifying
whether these patterns hold for green firms is important given the increasing interest in sustainable
development. For example, passed in the State of Washington in 2008, the Engrossed Second
Substitute House Bill 2815, aims to make the State of Washington’s economy more sustainable in
hoping to stimulate job creation in the “green economy.”
One challenge that has precluded a thorough investigation of the green industry (and made diffi-
cult the development of such industries for policymakers) has been defining what exactly comprises
this part of the economy. We leverage a recent definition proposed by the Green Jobs Initiative at
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) based on six-digit level of the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS).1 Broadly speaking, jobs are “green” if they are held at, or associ-
ated with, establishments that produce goods or provide services that benefit the environment or
conserve resources (output-related green jobs) or if the jobs at the establishments involve making
environmentally-friendly production processes or focus on using fewer natural resources (process-
related green jobs). We take this definition as given and sort all establishments in our data into
one of two categories which, for simplicity, we refer to as the green and brown (for short, but,
more appropriately perhaps, the non-green) industries.2 While our primary interest is to evalu-
ate whether the behavior of green firms is fundamentally different from that of non-green firms,
we also consider whether the “type” of green firm is important. Specifically, the BLS partitions
the green industries into five subcategories: renewable energy (CAT1), energy efficiency (CAT2),
pollution abatement and/or recycling (CAT3), natural resource conservation (CAT4), and, lastly,
environmental compliance, training, and awareness (CAT5).
1The website for the Green Jobs Initiative at the BLS, http://www.bls.gov/green/, describes information on the
funding, development, and status of the program.
2This language and abstraction is analogous to researchers concerned with environmental economics who might
distinguish brown, or polluting, firms from all other firms, which are then referred to as green. While this is common
practice, given our research interest and the definition we employ, the partition works in the other direction for our
research: we distinguish green firms from all other firms, which we refer to as brown firms.
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We focus exclusively on the State of Texas during the period 2000–2006 and employ Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data which allow us to observe key establishment-level
variables at a reasonable level of industry disaggregation. Although we were forced to consider one
state due to data limitations, the restriction is, in some sense, attractive in that environmental
regulations are typically enacted at federal and state levels.3 As such, any changes (observed or
unobserved) in state policies that occur during our sample obtain throughout our region of interest.
Of course this mitigates endogeneity issues that might arise with policy changes but, of course, we
cannot say anything concerning the efficacy of such policies either. Note, too, that since the BLS
definition was proposed after the end of our period of analysis, we avoid endogeneity problems due
to counties and municipalities attempting to attract the recently-defined green industries. It should
also be noted that Texas is a large and diverse economy and limiting the analysis to Texas is not,
in fact, overly limiting. Indeed, as the second-largest state economy in the U.S. (after California),
Texas ranked as the 15th largest economy in the world in a comparison of countries and states by
gross domestic product, surpassing many notable national economies.4
Our research is, perhaps, complementary to that of researchers concerned with the effects trade
has on the environment and the relationship between environmental policies and foreign direct
investment (FDI). These researchers typically concentrate on identifying or testing whether brown
(dirty) industries are attracted to certain locations based on pollution-based policies, while our
focus is on identifying factors and patterns, if any, that appear important in attracting green
firms and developing a sustainable economy (or, perhaps, lead to the exit of green firms).5 Most
notably, perhaps, the pollution haven hypothesis is built on the endogenous response of a state (in
intranational models) or country (in international models) to attract such industries by reducing
pollution standards. Often empirical researchers leverage differences in pollution policies (such
as emissions tax rates) or regulation levels (such as attainment or non-attainment distinctions)
to evaluate the effects on firm costs, entry, and growth. For example, Levinson [1996] found
that interstate differences in environmental regulations did not affect the location choices of most
manufacturing plants. However, List and Co [2000] found that state environmental regulations
did alter multinational corporations’ new plant location patterns. List [2001] considered how the
3For example, Texas has a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) concerning solar, wind, geothermal, hydroelectric,
tidal energy, and biomass, which mandates “the construction of certain amounts of renewable energy and prompted
the renewable energy industry to rapidly accelerate its production on Texas sites.” (State Energy Conservation
Office website: http://www.seco.cpa.state.tx.us/re rps-portfolio.htm.) The Texas Legislature increased the state’s
renewable-energy goal in 2005. The RPS, however, does not favor one county (location) relative to another which is
key for us given we use variation in county characteristics across Texas and over time to identify important features
that explain green entry, grown, and survival.
4Gross domestic products for countries were obtained from the The World Factbook produced by the Central
Intelligence Agency while gross domestic products for states came from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
5Other researchers who restrict attention to brown industries focus on quantifying the impact of environmental
regulations on total factor productivity growth (for example, Barbera and McConnell [1990] considered five pollution-
intensive industries), investigating the determinants of environmental innovation (for example, Brunnermeier and
Cohen [2003] restricted attention to U.S. manufacturing industries), or other policy-driven effects.
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number of FDIs in California were related to previous counts of FDI, market size, and land area. List
found some evidence of agglomeration effects at the county level which suggests that environmental
regulatory policy may not be what is important, but rather benefits from agglomeration effects.
In fact, many researchers have treated the subject of agglomeration economies (including knowl-
edge spillovers) from various perspectives such as the location choices of industries (Henderson
[1986]), location choices of firms (Rosenthal and Strange [2003] as well as Woodward et al. [2006]),
firm exits (Staber [2001]), industry growth (Glaeser et al. [1992], Henderson et al. [1995], as well
as Combes [2000]), and labor productivity (Ciccone and Hall [1996]). Combes [2000] noted that
a greater number of similar firms within a locality should increase the likelihood of complemen-
tary knowledge spillovers since there is greater likelihood of closer matches between firms. The
consequence of this intra-industry knowledge spillover is, as Glaeser et al. [1992] pointed out, that
“regionally specialized industries should grow faster because neighboring firms can learn from each
other much better than geographically isolated firms.” Also note that Ciccone and Hall [1996]
concluded that locally increasing returns to density explain more than half of the variation of la-
bor productivity across U.S. states. We include agglomeration effects (within a county as well as
in contiguous counties) and knowledge spillover effects (either through firm agglomeration effects
or by university and junior college research funding) in our firm entry, employment growth, and
survival models.
The driving question of researchers concerned with the relationship between environmental pol-
icy and various economic measures is quite attractive: they try to link potential consequences
of a policy using observed outcomes and investigate whether the effects are significant (and sub-
stantial). Similarly, Devereux et al. [2007] considered whether government subsidies (discretionary
grants) affected where domestic and multinational firms located new plants. They found firms to
be quite insensitive to the government policies (consistent with much of the conclusion reached by
those studying the pollution haven hypothesis) and more attracted to areas offering, for example,
co-location benefits. This suggests that the intrinsic features, whether exogenously fixed (such
as resources) or endogenously determined (such as market structure and firm agglomeration), of
locations is most important. Thus, if the regulatory environment is not a factor, can it be that
green and brown industries are attracted to locations for similar reasons? Some evidence for po-
tential differences was provided by Eichholtz et al. [2010] who found buildings with green ratings,
characterized by Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) or Energy Star certifi-
cation, garnered significantly higher commercial office rents, suggesting that such classification has
economic value.
We find that the green and brown industries appear to respond to similar non-policy factors
and, in general, entry and growth patterns are quite similar across industries. Agglomeration effects
are most important in explaining firm entry and employment growth, and although agglomeration
effects are not fundamentally different in attracting green industries, they help employment growth
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in green industries more than in brown industries. Having said that, being a green firm seems to have
significant negative employment growth effects for Texas counties, although employment growth
in green industries is positively correlated with income which is not true for brown employment.
Concerning survival, green firms are more likely to exit compared to brown firms, although this
effect is weakened if the green firm has previous experience. Moreover, agglomeration effects are
important in helping firms remain in business. In addition to investigating the entry, growth, and
survival patterns for the intra-green subcategories, we identify which counties within Texas have
comparative advantages in each of these subcategories.
Our paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we describe how we identified green industries
using the BLS definition while, in section 3, we discuss our data and present some general patterns
we observe. We investigate these patterns in further detail by estimating various empirical models of
firm entry, employment growth, and firm survival in section 4. In section 5, we identify comparative
advantages for each county within Texas based off the green subcategories and, in section 6, we
summarize and conclude.
2 Defining the Green Industry
On July 15, 2009, in order to measure green jobs accurately, the BLS created a discussion draft
for the Workforce Information Council. The main objective of this was “to produce objective and
reliable information on the number of green jobs, how that number changes over time, and the
characteristics of these jobs and the workers in them.” In addition to partitioning the number of
jobs by industry that are associated with green good and services (GGS) production, the BLS was
interested in estimating the occupational employment and wages for establishments identified as
producing these GGS. The BLS hoped that this information would provide policymakers and the
public with a better understanding of green jobs so that they could make informed decisions.
After surveying government, academic, and business studies, the BLS consulted with federal
agencies, state labor market offices, and industry groups to better understand activities related
to preserving or restoring the environment through efforts such as the production of renewable
energy, improving energy efficiency, preventing and/or cleaning up pollution, and conserving natural
resources.6 In particular, green jobs are either
(a) Jobs in businesses that produce goods or provide services that benefit the environment or
conserve natural resources.
(b) Jobs in which workers’ duties involve making their establishment’s production processes more
environmentally friendly or use fewer natural resources.
6Our discussion summarizes relevant material from the Green Jobs Initiative website provided in footnote 1 as
well as the Federal Register Notices published on this site.
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After realizing that there was no formal understanding for what constituted the green industry, the
BLS developed its own objective and measurable definition. Specifically, 333 six-digit industries
from the 2007 NAICS were identified as green.7 The BLS also partitioned this general definition of
the green industry into subcategories. Specifically, of the 333 six-digit NAICS industries, 58 were
categorized as relating to energy from renewable sources, 140 as relating to energy efficiency, 124
as relating to pollution reduction and removal, greenhouse gas reduction, and recycling and reuse,
75 as relating to natural resource conservation, and 45 as relating to environmental compliance,
education and training, and public awareness. Summing the number of members of each of these
subcategories suggests 442 industries, not 333. These values are reconciled because many industries
are classified into more than one of the subcategories. For example, NAICS code 221330 is speci-
fied as “steam and air-conditioning supply” and is classified in the green subcategories concerning
energy from renewable sources, energy efficiency, as well as pollution reduction and removal, green-
house gas reduction, and recycling and reuse. For each of the 333 industries, the BLS provided
examples suggesting why the industry was included. For example, the industry might be specified
as producing or certifying organic foods, as relating to LEED, as producing, repairing, or certifying
Energy Star products, as providing mass transit systems, etc. We take the BLS classification as
given and we employ the BLS NAICS-based definition in our analysis below to identify green and
brown establishments.
3 Data
We obtained data for this study from two primary sources. First, we use firm-level data for the
State of Texas from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) provided by the
Texas Workforce Commission. The data concern monthly employment and quarterly total wages
reported by every establishment in the state as required under the Texas unemployment insurance
program. Each record includes the specific location (address) of the establishment, the business
liability start-up date (the date from which unemployment insurance liability begins), and the
relevant six-digit NAICS code which is of particular importance for our work. Note, too, that
separate establishments (branches or franchises) of the same firm are distinguished and reported
in unique records. This panel data set is comprised of observations from the first quarter of 2000
(2000Q1) through the fourth quarter of 2006 (2006Q4), constituting 28 data periods.8 Each record
also includes each establishments’s unique Employer Identification Number (EIN). Therefore, the
appearance of a new EIN is used to define market entry and the disappearance of an EIN is treated
7We employ the final definition which was announced in volume 75, number 182 of the Federal Register Notice.
The official industry list can be accessed at http://www.bls.gov/green/final green def 8242010 pub.pdf
8The data were provided under an agreement of confidentiality and disclosure of the data is subject to certain
restrictions.
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Table 1: Distribution of Brown and Green Activity across Sectors
Brown Green Brown Green
Sector Firms Firms Employ. Employ.
Ag., Forestry, Fishing & Hunting 0.19 7.47 0.07 2.68
Mining 1.74 0.00 2.25 0.00
Utilities 0.18 1.70 0.31 3.51
Construction 0.48 33.82 0.96 24.99
Manufacturing 4.86 5.13 8.23 19.37
Wholesale Trade 9.33 0.44 5.77 0.39
Retail Trade 17.87 1.05 15.76 0.48
Transportation & Warehousing 3.95 0.36 5.51 1.55
Information 1.43 3.39 2.50 5.36
Finance and Insurance 7.97 0.19 5.75 0.07
Real Estate, Rental, & Leasing 5.90 0.00 2.23 0.00
Prof., Scien., & Technical Services 5.03 27.03 1.96 15.50
Management of Companies & Enterprises 0.13 0.73 0.06 1.65
Admin., Support, Waste & Remediation Serv. 4.87 4.35 8.09 3.25
Educational Services 1.12 1.05 6.71 14.18
Health Care & Social Assistance 12.41 0.00 13.51 0.00
Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation 1.28 0.40 1.01 1.04
Accommodation & Food Services 9.61 0.00 10.36 0.00
Other Services (except Public Admin.) 9.98 10.32 2.31 3.43
Public Administration 1.65 2.57 6.65 2.58
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
as an exit.9 One difficulty we faced, given our data come from the pre-2007 era, concerned the
mapping between the 2002 NAICS codes which characterize the QCEW data and the 2007 NAICS
codes which were used by the BLS to define the green categories. To identify the green categories
in the 2002 NAICS classification we used the concordances provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.10
We discuss details of this mapping in the appendix, in which we also provide a table which describes
the variables we use in our analysis.
In table 1, we compare the firm (EIN establishment) and employment distribution across the
two-digit 2002 NAICS sectors conditional on being classified as a part of the brown or green indus-
tries. The numbers in the table correspond to the percent of green and brown firms, respectively, or
the share of green and brown employment, averaged over the sample periods, that is attributed to
each of the sectors listed. As such, the columns sum to 100 percent. Before interpreting the table,
9Following Dunne et al. [2005], some EINs appear in a given quarter but are associated with previous EINs. We
do not treat such observations as new entrants given we can identify the prior EIN. The change in EIN may have
occurred because the establishment changed hands, a partnership was broken up, or for any number of reasons.
Unfortunately, we are not provided with any justification for the new EIN, but our data do allow us to recover the
relationship to a previous EIN. In our firm survival analysis, we control for these “firms with past experience.”
10The Census Bureau maintains concordances at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html.
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note that, in total, 23.32 percent of Texas firms are part of the green industry representing 18.01
percent of total employment. There are some stark differences in how economic activity is dis-
tributed across the green and brown industries. Agricultural firms account for a much larger share
of the green industry as many are concerned with the production of or services related to organic
produce and meat although, as a share of green employment, the sector is far less substantial. A
third of green firms are considered part of the construction sector, while a quarter of green employ-
ees are construction-related. The high share of green employment in construction is primarily due
to LEED policies and Energy Star certification. For example, many six-digit 2002 NAICS sectors
produce or install LEED-eligible materials or concern installation of efficient environmental con-
trol systems. Likewise, the high share of firms and employment in the professional, scientific, and
technical services is due to land surveying, architectural services, and energy- or resource-efficient
design services, again often relating to LEED. Although the shares of green and brown firms in the
manufacturing and educational services sectors are comparable, the shares of green employment in
these sectors far outranks that of brown employment, suggesting these green firms are larger than
their brown counterparts within these two-digit sectors, at least on average. This is not surprising
for educational services as the six-digit codes defined as “junior colleges” as well as “colleges and
universities” are both considered part of the green industry since they provide training for green
jobs. Unfortunately while the BLS justified their classifications of which sectors belonged in the
green industry, no rationale was provided for why some sectors were not part of the green industry
and so we cannot offer any formal insight into why sectors concerned with real estate, health care,
and accommodation and food services have no green firms (and, hence, employment). We remain
agnostic concerning the classification of the green and brown industries and take the BLS definition
as given.
We observe all QCEW variables across the 28 quarters constituting our data sample, in each
of the 1,299 NAICS codes (that existed in Texas for at least one quarter and survived our data
“cleaning” described in the appendix) for each of Texas’ 254 counties providing us with 9,238,488
raw observations. We aggregate entry, exit, and employment variables given the green industry
definition (and our green-brown partition), yielding 14,224 (= 28× 254× 2) observations, two per
county in each quarter, for our interindustry analysis and 35,560 (= 28 × 254 × 5) observations,
five per county in each quarter, for our intra-green industry analysis. In table 2, we provide some
summary information concerning incumbency, entry, exit, industry size, and quarterly wages in
the green and brown industries as well as within the green industry.11 The mean values reported
weight all counties and quarters equally and so they should be interpreted as representing the
average county at a given time in our sample.
11We measure firm exit by the presence (absence) of a firm’s account number in consecutive quarters. For example,
if a firm is present in quarters 1 and 2, but absent in quarter 3, we infer that the firm exited the industry during
quarter 2. Because of this approach, we have to throw out the final quarter for our exit analysis as we cannot decipher
which firms remained in the industry after our sample period terminated.
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Table 2: Green vs. Brown Industry and Green Subcategory Summary Statistics
Number Number of Number of New Number of Old Number of Quarterly
Incumbents Entrants Firm Exits∗ Firm Exits∗ Employees Wages
Green 423.65 11.36 11.00 10.56 9446.40 7634.60
(1574.61) (46.59) (48.28) (40.04) (45786.85) (2897.18)
Brown 1394.11 36.59 35.62 32.49 43001.47 6821.17
(5591.37) (163.58) (170.04) (132.70) (208570.20) (1670.26)
CAT1 55.88 1.67 1.93 1.43 1360.24 9497.85
(233.25) (7.45) (8.24) (6.09) (7755.70) (4662.23)
CAT2 235.58 7.52 7.60 5.76 4906.88 7766.29
(977.46) (32.08) (33.36) (24.79) (27123.73) (3689.31)
CAT3 205.90 6.44 6.45 4.98 4094.40 7676.20
(825.98) (27.40) (28.55) (20.69) (21927.56) (3086.04)
CAT4 81.01 1.88 1.80 2.16 1226.81 6852.95
(200.99) (6.57) (6.45) (5.38) (5430.48) (3061.03)
CAT5 98.54 1.95 2.39 2.62 2885.99 6977.42
(405.21) (9.62) (11.60) (11.03) (13254.26) (3691.74)
Standard deviations are in parentheses below each mean value.
∗ New (old) firm exits are exits by firms that we observed enter (were already in) our data sample
which began in the first quarter of 2000.
Based on the number of incumbent firms, the brown industry is over three times larger than the
green industry, although using employment numbers suggests the brown industry is over four and
a half times larger, implying brown firms are typically larger than green firms. We condition exit
statistics based on two types of firms: those that enter sometime during our sample which we also
observe exit (new firm exits) and those that were already in the market when our sample began,
but which we observe exit during our sample (old firm exits).12 For establishments that we observe
enter our sample, the number of entrants and exits are quite close to each other, suggesting the
two rates are comparable which is consistent with the findings of Dunne et al. [1988]. Firms that
were already in the sample when our data period began are typically less likely to exit the market,
on average, although this is not true for the subcategories CAT4 and CAT5. Comparing wages
suggests why policymakers might want to attract green firms: the average quarterly wage in the
green industry is over $800 more than in the brown industry. The intra-green industry subcategories
show the average wage can be over $2676 higher (CAT1) compared with the brown industry mean
wage. CAT2 and CAT3 are the largest subcategories, on average, in terms of both the number of
firms, entry into these industries, and the number of employees. They also provide above-average
paying jobs, even compared with the green industry as a whole. The only subcategory that comes
12This partition is necessary to prevent aggregate exit rates from being nearly twice entry rates. To see this, the
average number of total exits can be obtained by summing the number of entrant and incumbent exits in a given row
of table 2. This is deceiving given the firms considered in the old firm exists do not affect the entry rates.
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Figure 1: Composition of Green Industry in TX over Data Period
close to matching the average firm size (computed by dividing the average number of employees in
a category by the average number of incumbent firms) of the brown firms is CAT5, perhaps because
it contains education centers which are typically large.
In figures 1(a) and 1(b), we depict how the composition of the green industry in TX has changed
over our data sample based on the number of firms and employees. The bar for a given quarter
represents the share of green firms (employees) considered to be part of each green subcategory,
with CAT1 being the bottom bar, then CAT2, CAT3, and CAT4, so that CAT5 is the top bar.
The figures show remarkable stability within the green industry and for all subcategories over the
data period. Both figures show that CAT2 and CAT3 are not only bigger on average (as was
shown in table 2), but that they are the largest green subcategories in Texas for every quarter
we observe. Because the figures only convey how the composition of the green industry evolved
over time, they mask the overall trend in the number of firms and employees. In figures 2(a) and
2(b), we depict the percentage change in the number of firms as well as the number of employees,
respectively, across the quarters we observe in our data. While the changes in the number of firms
and employees fluctuate between relative gains and losses, the two series seem to follow the same
trend. These trends for the green subcategories follow a similar pattern and we do not present
them formally as the figures became too cluttered. We found, at the aggregate state level, the
most volatile subcategory in terms of the variance of the percentage change in employment was
CAT5, followed by CAT4 and CAT1, respectively. However, CAT5 was the most stable in that the
variance in the percentage change in the number of firms was lowest across our data periods, while
CAT1 and CAT4 had the highest and second highest variances in their percentage change in the
number of firms.
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Figure 2: Percentage Changes in Green & Brown Industries in TX over Data Period
While tables 1 and 2 capture some summary statistics concerning the green and brown industries
and figures 1(a)–2(b) depict how the industries have changed over the sample, neither of these
provide any insight into the spatial distribution of the industries across Texas—something that
might be important and help inform our empirical models. To better capture how the green and
brown industries are distributed across the state we constructed maps of the mean number of green
and brown incumbant firms in each county over the 28 data periods and of the mean number of
green and brown entrants for a given county over the 28 periods. Perhaps not surprising, the
major metropolitan areas as such as Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, and Austin, have the highest
concentration of the green and brown industries both in terms of the number of incumbents and the
number of entering establishments, suggesting that firms look to locate in either high population
areas, or areas where other firms are already established. Note, too, that a spatial pattern developed
around these MSAs: the MSA counties have the highest concentration of firms, neighboring counties
appear to have slightly less activity, and rural counties have the lowest absolute number of firms.13
Rather than present these four maps, we present in figure 3 a map depicting for each county the
mean green intensity—a relative measure computed as the number of green firms in a county over
the number of brown firms in a county. For reference, we have labeled the 25 metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) defined by the U.S. Census Bureau which are based off population.14 Surprisingly,
some counties have more green firms than brown firms, as indicated by a green intensity greater
13To save space, we have not included these four maps (an incumbent and entry map each for the green and brown
industries), but they are available from the corresponding author upon request.
14We list only the largest city in our labels. For example, the largest MSA in Texas is Dallas–Fort Worth–Arlington
which we have labeled “Dallas” to avoid overlapping labels. This seems consistent with the way the Census Bureau
identifies the areas which is motivated by size considerations and not an alphabetical one; for example, “San Antonio”
corresponds to the MSA “San Antonio–New Braunfels.”
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Figure 3: Average Distribution of Green Firm Intensity
than one. Moreover, a map considering an employment-based measure of the green intensity has
the same qualitative features.
These various slices of our data, as summarized by the tables, figures, and maps above suggest
patterns we investigate in more detail in the next section. However, they also inform us of features
that might be important for our empirical models: first, accounting for both population density and
agglomeration effects will be important; second, there may be spillover effects between neighboring
counties; third, the stylized facts we hope to characterize may be inherently different for MSA
counties than for the State of Texas as a whole. To account for other factors that might be important
in explaining firm entry, employment growth, or firm survival, we complement the QCEW data
described above with data from other sources. Specifically, county-level data as such as population
density, were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Population Estimates. We also
calculated the average quarterly county income by taking the average wages paid in the county for
all establishments reported in our QCEW data. Income seems to be not only a natural attractor
of firm investment, but may be particularly important for green investment and/or employment: if
green goods are normal goods then higher incomes would induce increased demand for green goods
and services. In our empirical models, we investigate whether income has a different effect on the
green industry compared with the brown industry.
In addition to the agglomeration and income effects we’ve formalized, we investigated whether
the presence (and magnitude) of a research center affects the green industry. Having research
universities provides access to expert consultants and allows for, often specialized, funding sources
11
which may play a significant role in attracting green industries. For example, Abramovsky et al.
[2007] found evidence that business-sector research and development activity is often located near
university research departments. In order to capture such effects we identified the local presence of
a four year university, junior college, or a research institution. Data on annual university research
and development (R&D) expenditures were obtained from the National Science Foundation.
To account for factor costs, as in Bresnahan and Reiss [1991], we used the yearly median rural
land price in each of 33 land market regions in Texas for the counties comprising the regions
as reported by the Texas A&M Real Estate Center. Given this variable does not change across
quarters and is common to groups of counties, we also included the county-specific property tax
rate. Lastly, as Woodward et al. [2006] suggested, cultural and natural amenities are important to
industrial attraction and skilled workforce retention. As in De Silva and McComb [forthcoming],
we focused on the share of county employment in local cultural and recreational amenities as being
potentially important. This measure was intended to capture the influence of the locality’s urban
amenities on its attractiveness. While natural amenities may be valued, urban amenities are both
more immediate and relevant to day-to-day life for full-time employed individuals. These activities
also reflect the scope of the locality’s amenities for business travelers as well as informal business
and social interaction.
4 Empirical Models & Estimation
While the summary information we’ve presented thus far suggested some similarities between the
green and brown industries, we would like to both identify factors that are important to under-
standing the green industry (and how it differs from the brown industry) and to control for things
that may have changed over our data period and across counties which may have muddled the ef-
fects we are trying to uncover. In this section, we describe formal econometric models we estimated
to better understand if there are inherent differences between the green and brown industries as
well as within the subcategories of the green industry. In the spirit of Dunne et al. [1988, 1989],
our interest is in firm entry, employment growth, and survival. We partition this section into three
subsections corresponding to each of these topics.
4.1 Entry
Firm entry helps promote competition and improve efficiency. An immediate impact of new firms
on a local economy is that they allow for job creation and attracting green investment is particularly
attractive to policymakers concerned with sustainable development. In this subsection, we describe
our investigation into the factors that attract firms in the green industry with particular emphasis
on whether these factors have different effects as compared with the brown industry. To the greatest
possible extent, we used a canonical set of explanatory variables that has appeared in the industrial
12
organization and regional economics literatures. There has been interest in both fields in spatial
effects, expressed through agglomeration economies, that attract firms and exhibit a self-reinforcing
tendency to grow. We captured agglomeration effects by computing the number of firms already in
an industry, within a given county at a given time. Since the green industries may be in a relatively
early phase of the industry life-cycle, agglomeration can be particularly important in their location
decisions when proximity to market is not a dominant factor. Thus, where localization leads to
pooling of green labor, facilitation of communication among suppliers, access to intermediate inputs,
and technological spillovers, an existing industry concentration increases the attractiveness of a
locality for an establishment surveying areas in which to locate. Any clustering of green industries
may also be the result of a deeper regional environmental consciousness insofar as it reflects social
receptivity and interest in green activities. While we cannot account explicitly for local attitudes
toward “going green” given our data, we included county fixed effects in our model to help capture
unobserved, county-specific effects that were constant throughout our data period. Likewise, if
these attitudes (or other factors, such as the overall health of the U.S. and Texas economies) are
changing over time but are common to all counties, then we can capture these unobserved effects
by including quarter-specific fixed effects in our model.
To consider factors that affect entry (firm investment), we constructed counts of the number of
firms within each industry (or subcategory) that entered each county in a given quarter and consid-
ered a Poisson model with fixed effects to help control for unobserved heterogeneity. Researchers
who adopt a standard Poisson model assume the dependent variable y is independently distributed
and the distribution of y is a Poisson distribution. A consequence of adopting this assumption is
that it imposes equality between the mean and variance of the dependent variable, conditional on
explanatory variables; i.e., E(y|x) = V(y|x). However, a specification test for overdispersion in our
data rejects the standard Poisson assumption. One alternative would be to use a negative binomial
model where the assumed distribution for the dependent variable exhibits overdispersion. How-
ever, the negative binomial model is only consistent if the conditional distribution of the dependent
variable is in fact negative binomial. Moreover, Guimara˜es [2008] showed that that the conditional
maximum likelihood estimator of the negative binomial with fixed effects does not necessarily re-
move the individual fixed effects in count panel data. Specifically, this happens only if the number
of groups is at least 1000 with more than 20 periods per group.
In contrast, the Poisson model is very robust in this aspect: regardless of whether the Poisson
distribution holds, a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator can be obtained via quasi-
maximum likelihood (QML) estimation. This is, perhaps, not surprising when comparing this
with the ordinary least squares estimator which shares the consistency and asymptotic normality
properties, regardless of whether the error terms are normally distributed. For the Poisson case,
Gourieroux et al. [1984] showed that a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator can be ob-
tained without specifying the probability density function of disturbances representing specification
13
error in the parameter of the Poisson distribution. Likewise, Wooldridge [1999] showed that the
fixed effects Poisson estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal as long as
E(yijt|αj ,xijt;β) = αj exp(x′ijtβ)
where, in our case, yijt represents the number of entering firms in industry i, in county j, at time t,
and αj is fixed effect for county j. Furthermore, Wooldridge derived a robust covariance matrix for
the Poisson QML estimator with conditional fixed effects. Thus, given our interest in the effects of
the explanatory variables on the mean response, we estimated a Poisson model by QML.15
While the estimated coefficients obtained from Poisson QML estimation are identical to Poisson
regressions with fixed effects, the standard errors must be adjusted for overdispersion.16 In table 3,
we report results from four models estimated via Poisson QML in which robust standard errors were
clustered by counties. We constructed these models to uncover any differences in the entry behavior
between green and brown firms as well as within the green industry by comparing subcategory entry
patterns. To investigate potential differences we considered two samples: a full sample involving all
counties in the State of Texas and a restricted sample involving only counties that are considered to
be part of a Texas MSA. This restriction is motivated by an observation that most entry occurred
around population centers. In all models, we included as conditioning variables measures of county
income, agglomeration within a county—computed as the number of like firms already present in
the county of a certain type (green, brown, or belonging to a specific category), agglomeration in
neighboring (contiguous) counties, university and junior college funding for each county, the county
unemployment rate, the population density of the county, the rural land price for the market region
to which the county belongs, as well as county and time fixed effects to account for county-level
and time-specific unobserved heterogeneity.17 In table A.1 in the appendix we describe formally
how these variables were constructed.
The four models in table 3 are distinguished by the comparison (green versus brown industries
or a intra-green industry comparison) or by the sample (full sample versus the counties comprising
the Texas MSAs). An initial comparison of the entry behavior between green to brown firms might
consider whether, conditional on all other covariates, the average number of entrants (captured by a
green dummy variable) suggests differences. Both samples indicate there is no significant difference
in the likelihood of green and brown firms entering a county, all else equal. Note too, that income
effects are not important in attracting new firms in any of our models. The most important factors
15Cameron and Trivedi [2005] described and compared methods for estimating cross-sectional count data models
in Chapter 20 of their book.
16Simcoe [2007] provided an implementation of the Poisson QML model with conditional fixed effects suggested by
Wooldridge [1999].
17In explaining entry, all right-hand side variables were lagged by a quarter to reflect the county environment at
the time each new firm entered. As such, we had to throw out the first period of data as lagged variables are not
available for the entry counts in the first data period.
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in explaining firm entry are agglomeration and population density. For example, the incidence rate
ratio calculated using the agglomeration variable in model (1) is 2.12, suggesting that a one percent
increase in agglomeration attracts about two new entrants per county per quarter, although the
effect is not significantly different for the green industry. This is consistent with List [2001] (as well
as others cited in our introduction) who found that agglomeration is the primary factor in driving
firm entry. Overall, the Poisson QML estimation results suggest no difference between green and
brown entry patterns.18
If the sample of observations is restricted to only green entrants, we can investigate whether
entry patterns differ across subcategories. Here our benchmark is CAT5, which we omitted. Entry
is more common in CAT1, CAT2, and CAT3, all else equal, as shown by the subcategory dummy
variables. These subcategories have slightly lower agglomeration effects, although the total effects
from agglomeration are still positive and significant; however, like the green-brown comparison, the
agglomeration effects do not seem to cross county borders as agglomeration in contiguous counties is
not important in explaining firm entry. We also do not find evidence of knowledge spillovers (beyond
that captured by the agglomeration variables) as measured by our research funding variables.
4.2 Employment Growth
To evaluate whether there are differences in the growth of the green and brown industries (or be-
tween subcategories within the green industry), we considered a simple regression model to try and
explain the percentage change in industry (subcategory) employment of the counties. Specifically,
in comparing the green and brown industries, we estimated the following model by ordinary least
squares:
log (Eijt + 1) = x
′
jtβ + εijt
where the error term consists of independent shocks
εijt = αi + γj + +θt + uijt.
We account for industry-specific unobserved heterogeneity αi, county-specific unobserved hetero-
geneity γj , and time-specific unobserved heterogeneity θt, by including industry, county, and time
fixed effects. The uijt represents idiosyncratic error accounting for unobserved factors that change
over time and across industries as well as counties. In our notation, Eijt denotes total employment
in industry i, in county j, during period t. For our intra-green industry subcategory analysis we
use the same model but Eijt is employment in subcategory i for a county in a given quarter.
18We also considered estimation of the models based on only the green industries and only the brown industries
(which have the advantage of essentially interacting the green dummy variable with each of the covariates) which
would be analogous to the approach taken by List and Co [2000]. Results are very similar but harder to interpret
given the sample changes across model runs—this is particularly relevant for comparing the subcategory estimates
to those of the green industry as a whole. These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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In table 4, we present results from estimation of these linear regression models. Because the
full and restricted sample results are at least qualitatively similar, we interpret the results in a way
that applies to both columns (1) and (3) of the table. The employment growth within a county is
higher for brown industries, all else equal—the BLS Green coefficient suggests that the percentage
change in employment in green industries will be 5.275% less than that of the brown counterpart.
Higher incomes lead to a negative effect (a decrease) in brown employment, while the trend is
reversed for green employment, perhaps offering some (indirect) justification for assumption that
green goods and services are normal goods—as is often maintained in the environmental economics
literature. Agglomeration effects help increase growth in industry employment and the effect on
green industries is slightly higher (and significant). These results are consistent with the findings of
Glaeser et al. [1992], Henderson et al. [1995], as well as Combes [2000]. A high population density
in a county leads to decrease in the growth of industry employment.19
The intra-green industry analysis suggests that employment growth is significantly lower in
most green categories, relative to CAT5 (the omitted subcategory), conditional on the exogenous
variables included in our model (the coefficient on the CAT1 dummy variable is positive in the full
sample model (2) and negative in the restricted sample model (4)). Agglomeration effects are also
important in explaining employment growth in the green subcategories and, although the effect is
most important for CAT5, all agglomeration effects are positive and statistically significant. The
agglomeration effects presented in table 3, which suggested that new firms are attracted to counties
with many incumbent firms, serves to compound these effects.
4.3 Firm Survival
Finally we examined the survival of green and brown establishments using a proportional hazard
model as proposed by Cox [1972]. Specifically, we observe the start date for each firm in our
sample and infer firm exit as a disappearance of an EIN across consecutive quarters. In doing this
we construct a sample of measured durations representing the time until a firm exits the market.
Consider modeling the conditional probability that firm `, competing in industry i and located in
county j, exits the market at time t as
λ(t|x`ijt;β) = exp(x′`ijtβ)λ0(t)
19We considered alternative formulations, including models with the logarithm of industry (subcategory) employ-
ment as the dependent variable and the logarithm of total (green industry) employment as an explanatory variable
(the assumption being that green or brown employment differ from the trend in total employment), or models in
which we tried to explain variation in the share of industry employment in the green and brown industries (within
the green industry for the subcategory analysis) although the models had qualitatively similar estimation results;
however, the interpretation of the coefficients differs and is more complicated given our interest in employment growth
and not changes in the composition of employment which may “improve” even though employment is decreasing.
These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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where λ(t|x`ijt;β) is the conditional hazard rate and λ0(·) is an unspecified baseline hazard function.
In describing the Cox regression model, we have made a common parametric assumption that the
durations follow an exponential (or, more generally a Weibull) distribution.20
As in Audretsch and Mahmood [1995], we restrict attention to all non-censored episodes of
single birth-death transitions and allow the covariate matrix X to vary with time. The covariate
matrix and can be divided into three groups comprising firm-level, county-level, and market-level
characteristics. Firm-level covariates are the green or brown classification (or green subcategory in
the intra-green industry analysis), a set of dummy variables to identify new firms and firms with
past experience, the establishment’s age, current average wage and relative employment compared
to the county green or brown total employment. County-level variables are the agglomeration
variables (within a county and considering neighboring counties), the level of university and junior
college funding, population density, property tax rate, rural land price, and the amenities ratio. We
also included county fixed effects as well as time fixed effects to capture market-level fluctuations.
We present the results from estimating these survival models, in the same format as our earlier
estimation results, in table 5. The green-brown comparison results are, for the most part, robust to
the sample definition, as can be seen by comparing columns (1) and (3). In interpreting the results,
a positive (negative) coefficient indicates that the factor contributes to firms having a lower (higher)
survival rate, all else equal. Thus, compared to brown industries, survival rates are lower for green
industries—the failure rate of green firms is exp(0.117) = 1.124 which is 12.4% higher than than
of brown firms. Similar patterns can be observed for new firms (although being a new green firm
does not have any additional significant disadvantage), counties with high unemployment rates,
population densities, property tax rates, and rural land prices. Consistent with Dunne et al. [2005],
firms with past experience survive longer and it seems experienced green firms are even more likely
to remain in business. High wage rates are correlated with firm survival, and even more so for green
firms. Firm agglomeration within a county is again important in explaining firm survival. The older
a firm is, the more likely it is to survive and the employment ratio, which captures the size of the
establishment relative to like firms in the county, indicate that larger firms survive longer.
Within the green industry, the subcategory analysis suggest mixed results which are again
consistent across the different samples (which can be seen by comparing columns (2) and (4)).
Relative to CAT5 firms, CAT1 firms are more likely to survive while CAT2 and CAT4 firms are
less likely (conditional on all other variables). The subcategory-specific effects of being a new firm,
being an experienced firm, having higher wages, and having other like firms in the industry are
mixed (many of the interaction effects are small in magnitude relative to the respective total—
uninteracted effect of interest or are insignificant) although the effects of these variables overall
(without the interaction) are consistent with the green-brown comparison.
20The approach developed by Cox [1972] is semiparametric given that the baseline hazard is “conditioned out” in
estimation and need not be estimated (and thus does not require parameterization).
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5 Characterizing Green Specialization
To provide further insight in the green economy within the State of Texas, we focused on the five
subcategories and considered which locations seem suited to specialize in each subcategory given
our data. To identify these comparative advantages, we calculated subcategory location quotients
for each county and for each period in our data. Specifically, define
LQijt =
(
Eijt
Ejt
)/(
Eit
Et
)
where we denote subcategory i employment in county j during period t as Eijt and somewhat abuse
subscripts in our use—dropping the i subscript represents all green employment in county j during
period t (Ejt), while dropping the j subscript represents total subcategory i employment throughout
Texas during period t (Eit), and dropping both the i and j subscript denotes all green employment
in the state during period t. Location quotients are often used to compare the economy of one
region to that of some benchmark economy (which typically encompasses the regional economy).
In our case, we compare the share of green employment in each subcategory to that share of the
state’s green employment working in that subcategory. To summarize these measures in a concise
way, we compute a simple average over the data periods as
LQij =
1
T
T∑
t=1
LQijt
and interpret this as county j’s location quotient in subcategory i. A value of one suggests that the
employment share is exactly in line with that of the state employment mix (on average). Location
quotients are often used to characterize whether a region is an exporter (importer) of the product
produced in a given industry based on whether its value is sufficiently greater (less) than one. It
is in this sense that we appeal to location quotients to help identify which counties might have a
comparative advantage in certain green tasks.
In figure 4, we depict a map of the State of Texas in which we have shaded each county one of
five colors. The colors correspond to the five green subcategories and the color choice was made
by selecting the maximum of each county’s LQij values; i.e., max
{
LQ1j ,LQ2j ,LQ3j ,LQ4j ,LQ5j
}
.
Clear patterns arise that are consistent with what a state planner might suggest: counties with
large wind farms (such as Nolan and Upton counties—denoted in the map by the Abilene and
Odessa MSAs, respectively) specialize in CAT1; population-dense counties (such as those around
major metropolitan areas—in particular, the Dallas–Fort Worth area) often specialize in CAT2
which primarily concerns LEED-certified or LEED-eligible buildings or construction; the activities
in CAT3 seem more diverse and hence there is more variation in the driving factors leading to
specialization within this green subcategory; cattle production accounts for nearly half of the state’s
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Figure 4: Maximum of Subcategory Location Quotient Averaged over Periods
cash receipts for agricultural commodities and the state’s three largest cattle-producing counties
(Deaf Smith and Castro counties—denoted in the map by the areas around the Amarillo MSA) as
well as most rural counties (most of West Texas) all specialize in CAT4 which encompasses NAICS
codes concerning organic meat and produce; counties containing colleges and universities (such as
the University of Texas in Travis County—denoted by the Austin MSA, Texas A&M University
in Brazos County—denoted by the College Station MSA, and Texas Tech University in Lubbock
County—denoted by the Lubbock MSA) often specialize in CAT5.
6 Conclusion
We took as given the BLS definition of the green industries and compared features of these industries
to that of all other (brown) industries over a data period that took place before the definition was
developed and within the State of Texas. In general, we find little evidence that the the factors that
encourage entry, growth, or exit are inherently different for green and brown industries. Although
there are some specific effects that can be highlighted (for example, income effects are important for
employment growth in green, but not brown, industries), agglomeration within a county seems to
be the primary factor in attracting, growing, and retaining the green industries. Within the green
industry, our subcategory analysis highlights more distinctions across the types of green activities.
A caveat of taking the BLS definition as given is that the green versus brown industries may involve
too much aggregation, although there is little we can do to address this without challenging the
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stance taken on specific NAICS codes that comprises the BLS definition. The definition, however,
provides as much detail as can be hoped for under NAICS (six digits are the finest level of detail
that NAICS allows).
Our investigation of the non-policy factors that affect the green industry cannot speak to the
efficacy of various policies designed to attract such firms. For example, Palmer and Burtraw [2005]
compared policies aimed at increasing the contribution of renewables to the total U.S. electricity
supply. It would be interesting to investigate if these policies (such as production tax credits, renew-
able portfolio standards, cap-and-trade policies, etc.) are successful in attracting firm investment
and growing green industries relative to the non-policy factors we’ve investigated. In some sense,
our results offer two potential interpretations: first, attracting green investment is no different than
attracting non-green investment; alternatively, attracting just a little bit of green investment can
pay large dividends in that agglomeration effects can obtain in proliferating the green industry.
Our initial characterization of the green industry was restricted to an area in which policy differ-
entials were nonexistent which prevents us from distinguishing between these two interpretations.
However, one could leverage variation in policies across states (in either a subnational, or inter-
national evaluation, given most environmental policies are set at the federal level) to consider the
costs and benefits of policies aimed at encouraging sustainable development. Such policy-specific
research would provide a valuable contribution in complementing our general analysis. Evaluating
such policies could consider the effects on individual industries, one of the green subcateogries, or
the green industry as a whole and can consider analysis across regions, states, or countries. Given
our findings suggest that green and brown industries do not respond in drastically different ways to
non-policy factors, this may suggest a role for policymakers hoping to stimulate green investment
and growth.
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A Data Appendix
As we discussed in describing the data we used in our research, one difficulty we faced concerned
the mapping between the 2002 NAICS codes which characterize the QCEW data and the 2007
NAICS codes which were used by the BLS to define the green categories. To identify the green
categories in the 2002 NAICS classification we used the concordances provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau—see footnote 10. We were forced to drop seven 2002 NAICS industries which appear to
be extinct—none of the industries had any new firms enter over our sample period and are not
listed in the concordances.21 In situations where one 2002 NAICS code corresponded with multiple
2007 NAICS codes, we specified the industry as green if and only if all 2007 NAICS codes were
defined to be green. In this sense our definition of the green industry is slightly more conservative
than the definition intended by the BLS. Specifically, because of this reason we were forced to drop
eleven 2002 NAICS codes due to conflicts in the way the corresponding 2007 NAICS codes were
classified—at least one 2007 NAICS code was defined as green while at least one other code was
considered non-green.22 A related issue concerned defining which 2002 NAICS sectors comprised
the green category variables. For instances in which a 2002 NAICS code mapped to multiple 2007
NAICS codes, we assigned the set of all the 2007 NAICS subcategories to the 2002 NAICS code. For
example, 2002 NAICS code 235710 is associated with 2007 NAICS codes 238991, 238992, 238111,
and 238112, which are all considered green industries under the BLS definition. Industries 238111
and 238112 are considered part of CAT2 and all four industries are considered part of CAT3 and
CAT4 under the BLS definition. Thus, we defined the 2002 NAICS code 235710 which encompasses
these four 2007 NAICS sectors to be part of CAT2, CAT3, and CAT4.
In table A.1, we describe the covariates used in the models we considered.
21Specifically, we dropped the 2002 NAICS codes 239891, 502362, 505221, 505411, 505413, 508141, and 513330.
22For this reason, we had to drop 2002 NAICS codes 234120, 234910, 234930, 235210, 315211, 315212, 326291,
326299, 339111, 421930, and 514199.
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Table A.1: Conditioning Variables
Variable Description
BLS Green An indicator variable corresponding to whether the observation relates to the green
(= 1) or brown (= 0) industry.
CAT1 An indicator variable corresponding to whether the observation was identified as re-
lating to “renewable energy” (= 1) or not (= 0).
CAT2 An indicator variable corresponding to whether the observation was identified as re-
lating to “energy efficiency” (= 1) or not (= 0).
CAT3 An indicator variable corresponding to whether the observation was identified as re-
lating to “pollution abatement and/or recycling” (= 1) or not (= 0).
CAT4 An indicator variable corresponding to whether the observation was identified as re-
lating to “natural resource conservation” (= 1) or not (= 0).
CAT5 An indicator variable corresponding to whether the observation was identified as re-
lating to “environmental compliance, training, and awareness” (= 1) or not (= 0).
Income Average wages per quarter paid in the county for all establishments as reported in
QCEW data.
Agglomeration The number of like firms already present in the county of a certain type (i.e., green,
brown, or belonging to a specific category.)
Agglomeration in neigh-
bors
Analogous to agglomeration, but considers like firms in all contingent counties for a
given (base) county.
College funds University and research center R&D expenditures reported by the NSF. The annual
NSF data actually span two calendar years. To convert these annual R&D expenditures
into quarterly data, we used a fourth of a given year’s total for Q1–Q3 (each), and a
fourth of the given year’s total for Q4 of the previous calendar year (as the federal fiscal
year begins in October). Although the NSF provides research funding by institution
and is identified by granting agency (i.e., DoE, EPA, DoD, etc.) we aggregated total
federal awards by geographically distinct institutions (i.e., system campuses are scored
separately) to compute a measure of R&D at the county level.
Junior college funds The same as college funds, but R&D expenditures by junior colleges within a county
for a given quarter.
Unemployment rate The county-specific, seasonally unadjusted, end-of-quarter unemployment rate.
Population density County-estimated annual population density from U.S. Census.
Property tax rate Annual county property tax rate.
Rural land price The yearly, median rural land price in each of 33 land market regions in Texas for the
counties comprising the region, as reported by the Texas A&M Real Estate Center.
Amenities employment ra-
tio
The share of county employment in NAICS 71, (arts, entertainment, and recreation),
NAICS 721110 (hotels and motels), 722110 (full service restaurants), and 722410
(drinking places, alcoholic beverages) as reported in the QCEW data. The NAICS
72 activities also reflect the scope of the locality’s amenities for business travelers as
well as informal business and social interaction.
Age The number of months that have passed since the firm’s start date.
New firm Firms that are three years old or younger (have an age of no more than 36 months).
Firms with past experience Firms that have a prior existing EIN and were later reassigned; for example, if the
establishment changed hands or if a partnership was broken up. We do not observe
the reason for the change.
Wage Establishment-level quarterly average wage which was calculated by dividing the quar-
terly wage bill for the establishment by its average number of employees for that
quarter.
Employment ratio The firm’s current employment as a share of total industry (or subcategory) employ-
ment within a county for a given quarter.
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